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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from the judgment of the District
court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which found
him guilty by a jury trial of violation of Section 76-6-302,
Utah Code Annotated as amended in 1975.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On Aprll 14 and 15, 1976, appellant was tried and
convicted of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 76-6-302,
Ctah Code Annotated as

a~ended

in 1975.

Ctah State Prison for an indeterminate

He was sentenced to the
ter~

of five years to life

in prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant petitions the court to hold Section 76-6-302,
Ctah Code Annotated as amended in 1975, unconstitutional as
applied to this plaintiff and to vacate and reverse the District
Court

judg~ent

or,

in the alternative, to declare a mistrial and

remand the case for further proceedings or, in the alternative,
to find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of
robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the 22nd day of July,

l97S,

Jcrr~

Grah~c

was

at Dan's Foodtown at 70th South and H1qhlano In-l"'·
County,

State of Utah.
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1 9 7 s , a r I' t l l

I

j

r:l r'

t

.... 3. s

d ~ ~:

in connection with the robbery,
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assailant and on July 23,
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1975,

~-~~

/

the appellant of aggravated robber·/ in ':iolati·r-:·:--.
76-6-302,

Utah Code .'\nnotates

~953
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Under the law, one acts intentionally or
with intent with respect to the nature of his
conduct or as a result of his conduct, when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or to cause the result.
Intent with which an act is done denotes a
state of mind and connotes purpose in so acting.
Intent, being a state of mind, is not always
susceptible of proof by direct and positive evidence
and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct,
statements and circumstances.
"Instruction No. 9:
You are instructed that
a firearm is not a deadly weapon unless it is loaded.
The Utah Code defines when a weapon is deemed to have
been loaded in 76-10-502, but if from the evidence
you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
gun testified to in this case was loaded, you must
find the defendant not guilty of aggravated robbery
and consider the lesser included offense of robbery."
"Instruction No. 10:
You are instructed that
for the purposes of this case, that a "dangerous
weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use
or intended use is capable of causing death or serious
bodily inJury.
In construing whether an item, object
or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is
a dangerous weapon, the character of the instrument,
object or thing; the character of the wound produced,
if any; and the manner in which the instrument,
obJect, or thing was used shall be determinative.
'Firearms' means pistols, revolvers, sawed-off
rifle and/or any device that could be used as a
weapon from which is expelled a projective by any
force."
"Instruction No. 11:
You are instructed that
facsimile is defined as:
An exact and precise copy
of anything.
An exact reproduction, for example, the
signature reproduced by rubber stamp."
"Instruction No.
12: You are further instructed
that a facsimile of a firearm is any instrument that
by 1ts appearance resembles a firearm."
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'
"Instruction No. 13:
Before yo'J can convict
the defendant of the crime of aggravated robbery,
as charged in the Information, you must find fror
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the
following elements of that crime:
1.
That on or about the 22nd day of cTuly, 1?::,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant,
Steven Craig Turner, unlawfully and intentionallv
took money or property from cTerry Graham.
·

I

2.
That said property or money was 1n the
possession or immediate presence of cTerrj' (;raham.
3.
That the taking of sa1d mone1· or proper(
from Jerry Graham was accomplished by means of
force or fear.
4.
That in the course of taking said m0m·~· Gc ,
property the defendant, Steven Craig Turner, use::'
deadly weapon consisting of a firearm or a facsl~ll'
of a f1rearm
~f ·:ou believe that the evidence establishes
eacn a:-,._, ::c:l of the essential elements of the o~fe'·"
bejc~~
~ ,·,:,c.s·:>nable doubt,
it is your dutj' to con•:1::
the
.c.~.t.
On the other hand, if thE' e•.'idence ·,
failed to so establish one or morE' of sa1d elements
then you should find the defendant not guilty o~
aggravated robbery and then consider the lesser
included offense of robbery in accordance w1th tc,~
following instruction."

Closing arguments were then heard an·l U1e Jur:·
began its deliberations.

After the JUrJ had lefl the c:Jurtro:·

time was granted by the bench tG except to the 1nstructions.
The State indicated it had no obJections.
to the above recited instructions

(T.l2J-4)

,.\1-'f.wllivil oh]ects~
tf;i'

the instructions were confusing and confl1ct1rr•; "'
objected to the statute as be1nq

unconslil•Jtu·Jrc~ll·

\1 r()un:~s rl ?'

: cJrt,,er
·1
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POINTS ON APPEAL
POINT I
SECTIOtJ 76-6-302 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS AHENDED IN
1975, IS VOID BECAUSE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO
APPELLANT IN THIS CASE.
Section 76-6-302 insofar as it is pertinent to this
case reads as follows:
"(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the
course of committing robbery he:
(a)
Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a deadly weapon;
The complaint under which appellant was charged reads:
"That the said Steven Craig Turner, at the time and
place aforesaid, robbed Jerry Graham, and in so doing,
used a deadly weapon, to wit:
a gun or facsimile
thereof;" (R.B)
The complaint charged defendant with using a gun or facsimile
thereof and that it was a deadly weapon.

Although the complaint

reads ln accordance with the statute, the difficulty in this case
arose when the court attempted to interpret the word "facsimile".
The term "facsimile" has been defined in a very few
dissertations on the law, but it does appear at least twice as
~ollows:

"Ft\CSIMILE.
An exact copy, preserving all the
marks of the original."
(Blacks Law Dictionary;
35 C.J.S.)
The common meaning of the word as given in
~ew UnabriJgeJ Dictionary,

l~ebsters

Second Addition, is the same:
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"1. Act of making a copy, imitation.
2.
An exact and detailed copy of anythina,
as of a book, document, painting, or statute;"
See duplicate.
(emphasis added)
Syn.
Appellant 1 s research has produced no case lav1 thac
defines the term.

One case has defined the word "imitation'

"The word 1 imitation 1 when applied to pistols and
revolvers means so nearly resembling the genuine
as to mislead."
People v. Delgardo, 146 N.Y.S. 2:
350 at 356; 1 Mise 2d 821 (1955) (Emphasls added)
From the above,

it is clear then that the term

"facsimile" means "an exact copy" whether one examines the'"
meaning or the legal meaning and that even an lr'li tat ion mea:'
same.

In People v.

Delgarda, supra, the court went on to

examples of cap guns and water pistols.

J"

Clearly the evidenc'

in this case does --:ct e•:en approach the meanir,g of these "·cr::
Mr. Graham tes-:.'.···: :n'1t he saw an inch to an inch and aha:
of a hollow tube:

(T. 10 and T.22)

"Q.
Now, you indicated you saw about arJ inc
and a half of a gun pointing out of a sh1rt, is t:."
what you stated?

A.

Yes,

sir.

Q. Would you expla1n to me
pointing out of hlS shirt?

·~·hat

''OU mean

A He had his hand under the bar1·el, ,_.,ras jus~
shir'
.!Cup under his shirt.
All I could se0 of t''down over lt was an inch ar1d a hal~ of the barreJl.

Q.
A

Did the barrel have a s1oht o!17
No,

JUSt a rounc,

short--
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"Q.

A.

Sure it wasn't a piece of pipe?
I don't believe it to be, no.

Q.
Very polished? Well, how did he have his
hand in his shirt with the gun poking out?

A.
He just had it under his shirt with his
gun stuck under coming out here.
(Indicating.)
And he was toward me this way so I couldn't see
how he had his hand.
Q.

Was his shirt tucked in?

A.

Yes.

It was.

Q.
Well, all you saw was something shiny and
round without a sight on it, is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.
You're sure you didn't give the police
any further description of what you've told us
here today?
A.

No.

Not that I recall at this time, no."

In its jury instructions the court expanded the meaning
of the term "f ac simile" well beyong its proper meaning.
Instruction #12 reads:
"You are further instructed that a facsimile
of a f1rearm is any instrument that by its
appearance resembles a firearm."
When Instruction 12 is read with Instruction 11, which requires
that a facsimile be an "exact and precise copy", it is clear that
Instruction 12 opens the door to a vast area of riefinition and
lnterpretation.

In effect,

Instruction 12 cancels and eliminates

the need for Instruction 11 and the jury might be persuaded by
something other than an exact duplicate.
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When Instruction 12 is read together with Instruc::j
the vagueness is even more pronounced.

In Instruction 9 th; I
I

instructs the jury that they must find that the gun was loac,
1

while in Instruction 12, the object need not even be a gun ;:I
I

no instruction indicates that the facsimile need be dangero'.'
deadly, but need only resemble,
Clearly,

1

I
I

in some unknown way, a gun. :

the instructions have so distorted the meaning o!t

words of the statute that they have no meaning whatsoever.
applied in this case,

the statute is vague and therefore

unconstitutional.
The statute must give fair notice of what is proh:j
People v. Barksdale, 105 Cal.
(1972);

People v. Carcia,

Gonzales,

534 P.2d 626

503 P.2d 1~6

Martinez, 85 Wash.

369;

541 P.2d 687

(Colo.

503 P.2d 2:'

(Colo.

1975); Peopl:_

1975); State v.

Kimball,~

119~21 · Hildahl v. State, 536 P.2d 1298 (Okl. £j
~·c,te,

84 Wash.

Rptr 1, 8C3d 320,

2d 874;

536 P.2d 373

2d 671,

538 P.2d 521

529 P.2d 1096

250 P.2d 561.

(Okl. Cr. Ct.
(1975);

(1975); State v.

l975l:S

Blondheim ·.j
----1

Packard,

~ 2 :J

The instructions in this case lea\'e absc:l

no standard as to the meaning of the word facs1mile.

The ob::

could have been a three-inch piece of rubber tubing painted

::

gray plastic tubing or any number of things that arE' neither
or dangerous and still appellant could have been conv1ctPd r:
vated robbery.

Furthermore,

under the

jury

case the entire object need not resemble

d

1

nstruct ions in ·

'Jiln.

:~r. Graham
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saw one inch of the object and that inch only looked like

par~

of a gun, yet appellant was convicted.
Appellant submits that the District Court's instructions so changed the meaning of the statute as to leave it vague
and uncertain, and therefore unconstitutional, as applied to
appellant.
POINT II
THE I~STRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT COURT ARE
CONFLICTING AND CONTRADICTORY.
1.

Instruction number 8 defines a deadly weapon in

the followina manner:
"A :leadly weapon means anything that in the
manner of its use or intended use is likely
to cause death or serious bodily injury.
(ef'lphasis added)
Instruction 8 requires

the jury to find that a deadly

weapon, as def1ned in the instruction, was used by appellant.

It

will be observed that the instruction defines a deadly weapon in
terms of the 2robability of its causing death.
The court then gives Instruction 10 on dangerous
weapons:
.. a 'dangerous weapon' means any item that in the
manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury.
Although Instruction 10 is appellant's instruction, appellant
submits that the two instructions together are conflicting,
contrad1ctory and confusing.
HCJ\'tnq the capacity

to kill is a more expansive defi-

In no
instruction
nition
likelihood
killing.
Sponsoredthan
by the S.J.havtna
Quinney Law the
Library. Funding
for digitizationof
provided
by the Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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does the court explain the difference in the two terms,

~~

after appellant's objection that the two instructions were
contradictory.

It is entirely possible for the jury to have

found appellant guilty on the more comprehensive definitioo
than on the meaning of the term "deadly weapon", the term
appeallant was charged with.

It was possible for the jury t:

have been confused with both terms and assumed them to
been the same.

Taken together, the two definitions

fusing and erroneous.
258 P.2d 452
687

State v. Hendricks,

(1951); State v. Wheeler,

ha~

are~~

l2_~-~t__:__~_2,

70 Id.

~~1._~-

P.2d

(1948).
2.

~deadly

Instruction 8 requires the appellant to ha\'e

weapon.

Instruction 9 requires that if the object

used was a gun ~~at : t ~ad to be loaded
classified as :,

..:•2.lJlj·

before it could ~

weapon and that if the gun was not
I

loaded the jury could not find appellant guilty of aggravate:
robbery.

Instruction 10 then defines a dangerous weapon.

Without an explanation as to the reason for the use of the
definition the jury could then believe that this third defi·:
nition would also suffice to convict.

Instruction 12 then
I

defines facsimile 1.n broad terms and does not require that''
!
facsimile be loaded, dangerous or deadly, nor does it requll
that the facsimile be likely or capable of causing death.
essence then, the jury now has a fourth reason,
distinct from the first three,

to convict.

rc•J.l·"rate
an'
~
-'

Fin all\',
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t

Instruction 13 is given which leaves the impression that a gun
or facsimile of a gun is per se a deadly weapon.

The instruc-

tions, therefore, have left the jury with at least five
possible methods of convicting, all contradictory, and appellant is the recipient of the effects.

State v. Hendricks,

supra; State v. Wheeler, supra.
3.

It should be pointed out that the complaint charged

appellant with use of a deadly weapon and that the deadly
weapon was a gun or facsimile of a gun.

The instructions,

however, expand the complaint to include the ones other than
a deadly gun.

It is contrary to law to expand the theory of

law beyond the limits of the complaint in the instructions.
State v. Anderson, 100 Ut. 468, 116 P.2d 398.
CONCLUSION
Section 76-6-302 as applied in this case is unconstitutional.

The instructions given to the jury were contra-

dietary, confusing and over-expansive and, therefore, erroneous
and contrary to law.

Appellant, therefore, submits that this

court should reverse the lower court's decision or, in the
alternative, find the defendant guilty of the lesser included
offense of robbery under Section 76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated
19 53.

Respectfully

submit~ed.,

•, SUMNER J .. 'HATCH
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Mailed two cop1es o:' the
Mr.

Robert B.

Capitol,

Hanser,,

,\ttornc~·

Salt Lake C1l'/,

17th day of Febrllary,

1~'tar.

fore·~oinq

General of
84114,

lJri<e~

·.· 1>J~,,

jJC.~stuc:c

r.:·

to t·1r.

:: j~

State

,·d~,

':".ls

1 'J 71.

/
SUMNER J.

HATCH

- j.
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